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FOREWORD
Relations between the United States and China reached their
lowest point in almost 20 years when President Bush imposed sanctions
on Beijing after the People's Liberation Army (PLA) indiscriminately
fired at unarmed demonstrators and their supporters at Tiananmen
Square on June 4, 1989. In the intervening years, some U.S. contacts,
particularly trade, quickly attained or exceeded their pre-Tiananmen
level. However, until recently, the U.S Government resisted
reestablishing formal security links.
In this study, Dr. Wilborn examines U.S.-China security
cooperation before Tiananmen, the strategic context in which it took
place, and the strategic environment of U.S.-China relations at the
present time. He then concludes that the reasons which justified the
program of security cooperation with China during the cold war are
irrelevant today.
Security cooperation and military-to-military relations with
China are highly desirable in the strategic environment of the 1990s.
China is a major regional power which inevitably will affect U.S.
security interests, and the PLA is an extremely important institution
within that nation. Additionally, as a member of the U.N. Security
Council and one of the five acknowledged nuclear powers, China's
actions can influence a wide range of U.S. global interests. In the
future, China is likely to be even more powerful and its actions more
significant for the United States.
Structurally, renewed U.S.-China security cooperation can be
modeled on the program of the 1980s. However, the purpose of the high
level visits, functional exchanges, and technological cooperation will
no longer be to strengthen a strategic alliance against a common
enemy, as it was before, but to contribute to stability in an
important region of the world and to achieve U.S. global objectives.
This study fulfills a requirement in SSI's research program for
1994, Strategic Challenge During Changing Times. The Institute is
grateful for a grant from the Institute of National Security Studies
of the U.S. Air Force Academy, which partially supported Dr. Wilborn's
field research, and offers this monograph as a contribution to the
ongoing dialogue on U.S. strategy in Asia and the Pacific.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN
Colonel, U.S. Army
Acting Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Suspended for 5 years after the Tiananmen Square massacre, the
United States and China have renewed the security cooperation
relationship initiated in 1983.
From 1971, when National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger
visited Beijing to affect rapprochement with China, until 1983,
security cooperation between the two nations was sporadic and limited,
even though their common opposition to the Soviet Union was the basis
of the relationship. However, by 1983, adventurist moves by the Soviet
Union, including the invasion of Afghanistan, coupled with an
understanding between Washington and Beijing concerning U.S. relations
with Taiwan, had set the conditions for a more extensive and
systematic program.
U.S.-China policy called for "three pillars" of security
cooperation: high level visits, functional exchanges, and sales of
defensive weapons and weapons technology. In fact, frequent high level
visits involved the key defense and military figures of each nation.
However, functional exchanges, organized by individual services
and only begun in 1985, were limited and engaged relatively few
mid-level officers from both sides. The initiative for these exchanges
appears to have come from the United States. By 1988, the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) had begun to withdraw from the functional
exchange program between its ground forces and the U.S. Army.
The last "pillar," arms sales, turned out to be limited, also.
The PLA sought only a few systems, although it discussed a broad array
of weapons and equipment with U.S. Government and defense industry
representatives. The PLA entered into four Foreign Military Sales
Agreements and several commercial contracts involving relatively small
purchases when compared to other U.S. customers, including Taiwan.
President George Bush suspended all aspects of security cooperation in
June 1989.
Had the events of Tiananmen Square not abruptly interrupted the
U.S.-China security cooperation program, significant alterations would
probably have begun to occur anyway. The profound changes which have
transformed the international system and brought an end to the cold
war were already in progress in 1989. U.S.-Soviet relations were no
longer confrontational and, more importantly, President Mikhail
Gorbachev had conceded virtually all Chinese preconditions to
Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Washington and Beijing are renewing
security cooperation at a time when the trends which were unfolding in
1989 have already resulted in a new decentralized international
system. The cold war and one of the protagonists have disappeared.
Thus, the strategic rationale which justified U.S.-China security
cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s is no longer valid.
But the United States and China are key factors respectively in
each other's foreign and security policy calculations. As a major East
Asian power, China's behavior inevitably affects regional stability,
and also influences U.S. global interests. Security cooperation,
supplementing other aspects of binational relations, increases the
ability of the United States to influence and be better informed about
v

China and the PLA. It is also important for the United States to
improve its contacts with China's military because as an institution
the PLA performs critical political and economic roles within China.
Structurally, renewed U.S.-China security cooperation can be
modeled on the program of the 1980s. However, the purpose of the high
level visits, functional exchanges, and technological cooperation will
no longer be to strengthen a strategic alliance against a common
enemy, but instead to contribute to stability in an important region
of the world and to the attainment of U.S. global objectives.
Three other important characteristics should be included in
renewed U.S. security cooperation with China. These are:
• Policy direction centralized in OSD;
• Relatively slow, deliberate pace; and
• Transfer of only defensive weapons which cannot be used against
Chinese civilians or seen to endanger regional power balances.
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SECURITY COOPERATION WITH CHINA:
ANALYSIS AND A PROPOSAL
INTRODUCTION
After a hiatus of almost 5 years, the United States and the
People's Republic of China (PRC) have resumed security cooperation and
military-to-military relations. Exchanges of high level visits are
taking place again, and students from the U.S. Air War College and the
National Defense University are visiting Beijing. The U.S. Pacific
Command (USPACOM) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have
reestablished military-to-military contacts. And Washington and
Beijing have agreed to establish a binational commission on defense
conversion, through which the United States will help the PLA adapt
some of its systems, beginning with air traffic control, for civilian
uses.1
Despite ideological differences and historical animosity, the
United States and China initially established a program of security
cooperation at the height of the cold war as an expression of a common
strategic interest in restraining the Soviet Union. By the late 1980s,
the two governments were regularly exchanging high level visits of
defense and military officials and military delegations were probing
common functional problems. The United States had also approved a few
weapons sales to the People's Liberation Army (PLA). But on June 4,
1989, before CNN cameras, PLA units fired indiscriminately into
demonstrators in Tiananmen Square and their supporters in Beijing,
killing at least 700 and wounding thousands.2 As a result, President
George Bush suspended all U.S. contacts with the Chinese military and
imposed commercial sanctions on China. His administration did not
resume military-to-military relations with the PLA.
Security cooperation between the United States and China in the
1990s and beyond obviously is no longer required as a means to contain
Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union's principal successor, Russia, is
not an enemy (although perhaps a potential longer-term adversary) of
either nation. The strategic justification for resuming this
relationship spawned in the cold war is now based on a different set
of factors and priorities.
The purpose of the following analysis is to propose the outline
of a new U.S.-PRC security cooperation program, based on the political
and strategic context of the 1990s. It begins with a summary of
previous security cooperation between the two nations, in order to
find hints of the more--and less--effective ways to engage China in
military-to-military relations, and simply to provide an account of
the earlier relationship. That is followed by an analysis of the
current environment of U.S.-China relations, focusing on how the
behavior of China, and specifically the PLA, may impinge on U.S.
security interests and identifying potential risks and benefits of
security cooperation with China. Then the author provides his
suggestions for U.S.-PRC security cooperation. The final section is a
restatement of the major conclusions of the analysis.
SECURITY COOPERATION BEFORE 1989
Virtual enemies for two decades after the Chinese Communist Party
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assumed control of China in 1949, the secret diplomacy of Henry
Kissinger and Zhou Enlai in 1971 and President Nixon's extensively
reported visit to Beijing in 1972 transformed relations between China
and the United States. But outstanding disputes, in particular U.S.
recognition of the Republic of China government in Taiwan and the war
in Vietnam, prevented establishing full diplomatic relations,
including formal security cooperation or regular military-to-military
contacts. Indeed, as late as 1980 there were many officers in the U.S.
armed services who still viewed the PRC as the enemy who had caused
tens of thousands of casualties among American forces during the
Korean war, and there were probably PLA officers with similar views of
the United States.3
Nixon and Carter Administrations.
In the period between Nixon's visit and the normalization of
U.S.-China relations in 1979, the United States and China supported
each other diplomatically against the Soviet Union, and took similar
positions with respect to ASEAN and, after 1975, Vietnam. But security
cooperation was extremely limited.4 Washington reportedly shared
intelligence on the Soviets with Beijing from Kissinger's first visit
onward, often through the Chinese mission to the United Nations.5 These
intelligence briefings became increasingly frequent in the year before
normalization, and included a special NATO briefing for Mao and Zhou.6
The developing U.S.-China trade did not include weapons systems or
military equipment, but the Ford administration did authorize the sale
of American-produced sophisticated computers to Beijing. In 1978,
Washington withdrew its opposition to weapons sales to China by
Western European nations, even though no sales of military equipment
or weapons by American companies were permitted.
Upon de jure recognition of each other in 1979, more extensive
contacts in all aspects of relations, including security cooperation,
were possible. Deng Xiaoping, back in China after his memorable 1979
tour of the United States, told a group of visiting U.S. Senators that
China would be interested in exchanging port calls, purchasing U.S.
arms, and having American monitoring facilities on Chinese soil to
verify Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. Nonetheless,
the only military contact in 1979 was the visit of a U.S. National
Defense University (NDU) delegation to Beijing and several other
cities. Planned before normalization, the group was "unofficially"
hosted by the PLA. NDU hosted a PLA group the next year.7 A delegation
from the Corps of Engineers visited China in early 1980, consulting
with its hosts on flood control and similar topics, but not military
affairs.8
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 profoundly changed the
environment of Sino-American relations, and in the following year,
when Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited Beijing, he discussed
the sale of nonlethal military equipment and the formation of a
military relationship with China. The Brown visit resulted in
agreement for a wider range of military-to-military activities and a
U.S. commitment to sell dual-purpose technology and nonlethal
equipment--but not weapons systems. According to newspaper reports,
the United States and China also agreed to covertly establish two
facilities to monitor Soviet missile tests, which at least partially
compensated for similar facilities lost when Moslem fundamentalists
2

took control of the government of Iran the previous year.9
While military sales issues were not satisfactorily resolved in
this period--China wanted to be able to purchase U.S. equipment on the
same basis as other friendly, nonallied nations--the broader strategic
relationship between the United States and China seemed to improve
significantly. The policies of both nations with regard to a number of
questions, including Cambodia, Afghanistan, and American military
presence in the Pacific and East Asia, approached congruence. There
were also limited military-to-military exchanges. A PLA educational
delegation visited the United States in the fall of 1980.
Reciprocating the visit, a U.S. group representing the various war
colleges and several other service schools went to China in 1981.10 And
in the economic and cultural arenas, contacts grew increasingly more
frequent and varied.
Reagan Administration.
The Reagan administration, after a 2-year hiatus, further
expanded security cooperation with Beijing to reinforce and strengthen
the strategic alignment of the United States and China against the
Soviet Union.11 The period from 1981 until August 1983 was spent in
extensive negotiations, resulting in a Sino-U.S. Joint Communique.12
Through it, Washington surrendered some of its independence in
fulfilling U.S. obligations to the security of Taiwan under the Taiwan
Relations Act, even though Reagan and some of his supporters clearly
felt a personal and ideological commitment to the Nationalist regime.13
For its part, Beijing, while it would not renounce the use of force
against Taiwan, did state that its policy was to reunify the
Motherland peacefully, and accepted without approval that the United
States would continue to contribute to the security of Taiwan.
The new program of security cooperation, announced in the summer
of 1983 by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in Beijing, consisted of
"three pillars": comprehensive high level visits, functional
exchanges which allowed the PLA and U.S. armed forces to explore
common problems and interests, and the sale of U.S. defensive weapons,
military equipment, and technology to China.14 While Beijing
participated in the activities of all three dimensions, Washington
initiated the program and was its principal champion.

High Level Visits. Virtually all of the top leadership of the
U.S. Department of Defense and services made trips to China. Casper
Weinberger, in Beijing when the program started in 1983, went again in
1986, and his successor, Frank C. Carlucci, visited in 1988. The
Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy also visited, and the Secretary
of the Army sent a personal representative.15 On the military side,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all of the service
chiefs travelled to China between 1985 and 1989.16
The traffic from Beijing to Washington was also impressive. It
included a Minister of Defense, Vice Chairman of the Central Military
Commission, Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Chief of the General
Staff, PLA Air Force and Navy Commanders, the Air Force Political
Commissar, and PLA Equipment Department Head. At least as far as
participation is concerned, the high level visit portion of U.S.-China
security cooperation must be considered a success for as long as it
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lasted.

Functional Exchanges. The second pillar of U.S.-China security
cooperation, functional exchanges, was implemented on the American
side by the individual services, each of which approached the
requirements differently. The Army delegated responsibility to the
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) which established with the PLA
General Staff a binational annual meeting on training, to alternate
between the United States and China.17 Always funded generously and
given strong command support on the U.S. side, two Chinese delegations
visited the United States, and two U.S. delegations visited China.
Delegations consisted of 9 or 10 people, headed by a one or two star
general or equivalent.18 The visitors were always given a broad
exposure to the host's training facilities, and also the opportunity
to see many parts of the host's country.19
There were never very many people on either side involved in this
program, although those few on each side with responsibilities for
planning and liaison developed effective working relations. In the
opinion of U.S. participants, professional and personal relationships
at the working level were uniformly forthright and open--even warm.
Both U.S. and Chinese participants in the exchanges appeared to
consider their experiences professionally valuable. TRADOC had
proposed, but the PLA had not accepted, more comprehensive functional
exchanges and educational exchanges in 1988 and 1989.
The Air Force and the Navy had less structured functional
exchanges. The Air Force hosted PLA Air Force (PLAAF) exchanges on
training and maintenance, each of which the PLAAF reciprocated.20 Like
the Army exchanges, the participants appeared to value the experiences
and supported extension of the exchanges. The U.S. Air Force and the
PLAAF were considering exchanges on storage and restoration and other
activities, including educational exchanges, when the United States
suspended all programs because of Tiananmen. According to one of the
closest observers to these activities, the PLAAF--or at least
influential members of the PLAAF leadership--wanted to emulate
selected USAF doctrine and practice, and did in fact adopt some
changes based on the USAF model.21 In addition to the functional
exchanges, the Air Force sent their prized aerial demonstration team,
the Thunderbirds, to Beijing in 1987.
For the Navy, three port calls, two by U.S. ships to Qingdao
(1986) and Shanghai (1989), and one by PLA Navy (PLAN) ships to Pearl
Harbor (1989), constituted the functional exchange pillar of
U.S.-China security cooperation. In addition to being high-level
protocol events--Commander, Pacific Fleet, and Commander, Seventh
Fleet, led the visits to Qingdao and Shanghai respectively--the port
calls also involved discussions about navy systems and procedures.
Because the PLAN had expressed interest in gas turbine technology and
the HH2 Foxtrot Seasprite helicopter, those systems were included in
the 1986 three-ship visit to Qingdao. There were also meeting and
passing exercises in conjunction with all three port calls.22

Arms Sales and Technology Transfers. The third pillar, arms sales
and technology transfers, produced considerable publicity but little
actual activity.23 The PRC received Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
customer status in 1984, but it sought only a few projects. The PLA
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also bought very little through regular commercial channels. Table 1
shows the totals for arms sale agreements and actual deliveries from
1977 through 1992. By way of comparison, U.S. military sales to Taiwan
exceeded sales to China in agreements and actual deliveries each year
from 1977 through 1992. Total deliveries to China for the entire
period were exceeded by deliveries to Taiwan in each single year
during that period. In terms of volume of items or costs, arms sales
to China never reached the level of a major military sales program.
Extensive discussions about arms sales and technology transfers
did take place between the two governments and between the PLA and
U.S. manufacturers. With limited resources and some appreciation that
there were limits to what the PLA could absorb, Chinese
representatives engaged more in window shopping than in buying.
Whereas U.S. vendors offered large volumes of end items for sale,
Chinese (when they were interested at all) sought only a few items and
technology. Whether China's purpose was more to gain information about
American weapons systems than to buy materiel, as has been suggested,
is unclear, but undoubtedly PLA specialists did learn much about U.S.
technology, as well as the lore of defense acquisition and the
intricacies of foreign military sales in the United States.24
The Reagan administration limited its offers to four groups of
weapons systems, all considered defensive: anti-tank missiles,
artillery and artillery defense, air defense, and anti-submarine
warfare. As it turned out, the PLA made purchases only in the last
three categories.25
The largest single program was an FMS $550 million agreement
involving upgrading avionics on 50 Chinese F-8 interceptor aircraft,
called the "Peace Pearl" project. The primary contractor was the
Grumman Corporation. Grumman's urgency to obtain the contract and the
PLA's obsession with secrecy combined to prevent the contractor from
knowing that the cockpit of each of the 50 aircraft was unique,
requiring individual adjustments which increased the costs
significantly. Grumman accordingly demanded cost overruns, to the
dismay of the PLA. The other three FMS programs were much smaller.
They were:
• A $22 million large scale ammunition program (LCAMP), in which
Hamilton/Bulova modernized fuse and detonator facilities for China.26
• A $62 million project for four counter-battery radars. Hughes
Corporation was the American contractor, and training of PLA personnel
was conducted at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
• An $8 million sale of four Honeywell anti-submarine torpedoes.
The largest commercial sale, a $140 million agreement, involved
the purchase of 24 UH-60A Blackhawk helicopters, produced by the
Sikorsky Corporation. There was also an agreement with Grumman to
upgrade another fighter, the F-7M, for export, and some smaller sales.
Of the FMS agreements, only the LCAMP project was close to
completion on June 4, 1989, when President Bush suspended all aspects
of security cooperation with China. Two of the four radars from Hughes
had been delivered, but none of the Honeywell torpedoes. Production
5
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had not begun on the Peace Pearl program, and the cost overruns had
soured relations with Grumman in any case, leading the PRC to
terminate the project in 1990 even though several F-8 aircraft were
being held by Grumman at its New York factory.27 The sale of Blackhawks
was the only significant commercial sale completed. Some 3 years after
Tiananmen, China finally received all of the undelivered items which
it had purchased, as well as F-8s being held by the Grumman
Corporation.28

Intelligence Cooperation. There was apparently another dimension
of U.S.-China security cooperation (a fourth pillar, so to speak) in
the intelligence sharing and combined intelligence activities which
dated back to 1972 and 1980, respectively. In addition to the
facilities established to monitor Soviet missile tests in 1980, some
five primary seismic research stations were placed in several Chinese
provinces between 1980 and 1984.29 According to a detailed report
leaked to The Washington Post, these activities were not affected by
the U.S. response to Tiananmen Square.30 Never acknowledged officially
by either government, it is unclear if these operations are still
maintained.
Status of the Relationship, 1988-89.
There is evidence that the pace of U.S.-China security
cooperation might have waned even if the Tiananmen incidents had not
taken place. In 1988, the PLA not only would not expand functional
exchanges with the U.S. Army, but it desired to suspend the annual
training dialogue for an unspecified time.31 Had all programs not been
suspended, the PLA might have relented and agreed to a somewhat
modified program for the future. But there clearly were reasons for
the Chinese to withdraw from, or at least slow down, security
cooperation with the United States.
On the pragmatic level, the costs in money and resources and the
requirements for reciprocity may have imposed greater burdens than the
PLA was willing to continue. While the costs of entertaining a
visiting delegation in China were less than in the United States, they
were still considerable, and the PLA budget was constrained. There was
a particular strain on the relatively small group of personnel who
were proficient in English. Moreover, the U.S. Army and Air Force were
discussing a number of longer term educational and training exchanges
which would be more expensive, and also would provide opportunities
for a deeper understanding of the host's operations. The PLA claimed
that it did not have living accommodations and quality of life
facilities which would be expected as a minimum by U.S. servicemen.
Rather than having to confront the possible embarrassment of
providing--or being unable to provide--reciprocity, the PLA leadership
may have decided to restrain and reduce the exchange programs to keep
them well within the capacities of the PLA. On the other hand, the PLA
leadership simply may not have wanted an educational exchange with the
United States if it provided U.S. officers the opportunity to become
familiar with the inner workings of the PLA, and exposed Chinese
officers to the relatively open intellectual environment of U.S.
military institutions. In any case, the ad hoc approach of the Air
Force, which allowed the PLAAF to more easily reject specific
proposals, may have been more compatible to the wishes of the PLA
leadership than the more structured and durable arrangements which had
7

been fostered by the Army.
Strategically, the Chinese leadership must have considered that
the initial rationale for Sino-American entente had all but evaporated
in the wake of Gorbachev's "new thinking" and the rapidly emerging
rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union. Rather than posing a
threat to China's vital interests, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev
had, by the spring of 1989, conceded all requirements which Deng had
made prerequisites to normalizing relations. Moreover, there were
possibly interesting prospects for security cooperation again with the
Soviet Union.
From the U.S. perspective, detente had similarly undermined the
logic of continuing to advance security cooperation with China,
although in 1988 and 1989 most civilian and military security
officials in Washington still considered the Soviet Union the global
adversary of the United States. U.S. officials were also bothered by
China's pattern of arms sales, especially the sale of Silkworm
missiles to Iran and of a CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missile
to Saudi Arabia. Beijing considered that complaints about China's
relatively modest arms sales program on the part of the second largest
weapons merchant in the world were inappropriate, at the very least.32
CURRENT ENVIRONMENT FOR U.S.-CHINA SECURITY COOPERATION
Few if any observers in Beijing or Washington predicted in 1989
the revolutionary events of the next several years which have so
drastically transformed the international system. Not only has the
bipolar world of the cold war ended, but one of its protagonists, the
Soviet Union, no longer exists, and its successor states, including
Russia, are in disarray. The principal reason for both nations to
engage in security cooperation with each other disappeared with the
dismemberment of the Soviet Union, if not sooner. If there are
strategic reasons for China and the United States to regularize
security relations with each other, they can no longer be based on
mutual fear of a common enemy posing a clear and present threat.33 But
they can be found in the needs of each nation to influence the
behavior of the other in order to attain its objectives in the region.
China's Influence on U.S. East Asia Policy.

PRC's Global and Regional Capabilities. For the United States,
China today is an important actor in both the international and
regional environments. While it is in no sense a superpower, it has
significant global capacities which can influence the success of U.S.
policies, and it has the potential to wield even greater influence in
the future. It is a member of the U.N. Security Council with a veto,
and can therefore frustrate or, at the least, strongly influence any
U.S. policy which requires a Security Council decision. As a selfproclaimed "Third World" state, increasingly successful in an economic
and military sense, it has the ability to influence other Third World
governments, either in support of or in opposition to U.S. global
interests. Because it is one of the five acknowledged nuclear powers,
China is central to restraining the spread of nuclear weapons and
weapons technology. Lastly, it is an important exporter of arms which
sells relatively sophisticated missiles to customers that the United
States considers dangerous, including Iran, Syria, and Libya.34
8

Regionally, China's ability to influence events and affect U.S.
interests is probably more significant. East Asia is the most dynamic
region in the world economically, accounting for ever increasing
volumes of U.S. trade, and offering increasing opportunities for U.S.
investments. Moreover, it is a region particularly vulnerable to
instability caused by the emergence of historic rivalries and disputes
partially restrained during the cold war by the strictures of the
bipolar system.35 Unlike Europe, there are no tested region-wide
institutions like NATO and CSCE which show promise for mediating among
disputants or providing channels for peaceful change. The behavior of
the region's largest state with the largest armed forces and the
fastest growing economy obviously will influence regional stability
and U.S. regional interests. In addition, China is one of the few
nations remaining in the world with the capability, as diminished as
it may be, of influencing Kim Jong Il's regime in North Korea, or the
State Law and Order Restoration Council in Burma, both governments
with which the United States has limited influence.
As many observers are increasingly pointing out, the PRC is also
a potential regional problem.36 As its economy provides greater
resources to pursue international objectives, China cannot be expected
to support all aspects of the status quo. Motivated by a strong
nationalism which transcends other ideological boundaries, Chinese
leaders will want to reclaim the international status they believe
that their nation has been denied since the age of imperialism, and
they should be expected to want the capabilities to act as a major
power.37 The increases in China's formal defense budgets since
Tiananmen, the obsessive secrecy surrounding actual expenditures and
capabilities of the military, the adoption of a new doctrine which
openly incorporates power projection in the national military
strategy, and the recent modernization of its navy and air force raise
the possibility and fear, especially in Taiwan and Southeast Asia, of
assertive intentions.
Moreover, numerous contentious issues could serve as the catalyst
for regional conflict. Almost all of the actual and nascent
territorial disputes in East Asia involve China. These include China
with India on the south, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on the west, Russia
and Mongolia on the north; and Japan, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines,
and Vietnam on the east.38 And for the United States, there is the
always sensitive and potentially dangerous question of the status of
Taiwan.

Potential Impact of Chinese Domestic Problems. A serious
political crisis within China could be destabilizing for the entire
region. Groups contending for power might seize on border issues, or
even the return of Taiwan to the control of the PRC, as rallying cries
to solidify domestic support. Even if domestic politics did not
directly extend into the international arena, weak, less effective
governance from Beijing and conflict among the provinces in the
context of a succession struggle will have repercussions throughout
East Asia.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is about to enter one of the
most critical periods of its history, at least as serious as the
previous crises associated with the Cultural Revolution, the death of
9

Mao, or Tiananmen Square. Paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, who still
sets the broad outlines of Chinese policy even though he holds no
official position in the Party or government, turned 90 years of age
in 1994. His passing will intensify the succession struggle already
under way, and inevitably introduce a period of greater instability
and uncertainty. Moreover, this will also represent a generational
change of enormous significance, for the next leader of the CCP and
the PRC will not come from the revolutionary generation who survived
the Long March and the civil war, and who with Mao established the
People's Republic. Instead, he and his coterie will be members of the
nomenklatura; technocrats and bureaucrats rather than revolutionary
fighters. No matter how effective or wise, the new leader will be
denied the source of legitimacy which all previous leaders enjoyed
merely because they had participated in the great struggle for
liberation. More than any of his predecessors, his ability to remain
in power will depend on success in modernizing the economy and raising
the standard of living of the population. He will not be able to rely
on past glories.
China also faces serious challenges unrelated to succession. The
nation is being battered by centrifugal forces emanating from the
reforms which shifted much regulation of the economy to market forces
rather than formal economic controls.39 The most prosperous areas, most
notably Guangdong, which includes Guangzhou (Canton) and several
special economic zones (the fastest growing entities in the Chinese
economy), resist Beijing's efforts to restrain export-driven economic
growth in the interest of curbing inflation or achieving economic
balance. A great deal of power over the economy has already devolved
to provinces, cities, firms, and sometimes even foreign investors.
Some political control has become decentralized also, and if economic
decentralization is not reversed, the authority of the central
government as compared to local power centers will almost surely
become weaker.
Economic inequality is a growing problem. The material well-being
of most Chinese clearly is improving, but for some much more rapidly
than for others. Many peasants appear to be left out, and believe that
they are left out, of the general prosperity which has produced
double-digit growth rates for the economy as a whole. The income gaps
between city and countryside and between coastal areas and hinterland
are getting larger, as urban and coastal rates of growth far outstrip
those in the rest of China.40
"Market socialism" not only has led to rapid economic growth and
noticeable inequality by eliminating many of the mechanisms of a
centrally planned economy, it has also undermined the ideology of
Communism, and thus a basis for the Party's legitimacy. Corruption,
not absent before the Deng reforms but certainly relatively limited,
has become pervasive, obvious, and widely resented.41 The most
prominent grievance expressed by the demonstrators at Tiananmen Square
related to corruption, and not the absence of democracy. Violent
crime, gambling, and prostitution, repressed in the days of monolithic
Party control, are now serious and escalating problems in the special
economic zones and the rapidly developing cities.42
United States as a Factor in China's Security Calculus.
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Chinese perceptions of the strategic significance of the United
States cannot be mirror images of U.S. perceptions of the strategic
significance of China. Each nation affects and is affected by the
other in the context of different interests and capabilities and each
represents a domestic political system which is almost the polar
opposite of the other on the spectrum of democratic-authoritarian
politics. But there are also similarities. As China can influence the
ability of the United States to attain some of its objectives, so can
the United States be either a facilitator or obstruction to China's
achievement of its global and regional objectives, for the United
States is the world's only superpower, it possesses the strongest
military capability, and it is the major customer of China's dynamic
export sector. The United States also annoys and frustrates China's
leaders because it supports the activities of dissidents, publicly
rebukes certain domestic social and political practices, and tries to
dictate policy relative to intellectual property rights and other
trade-related procedures.
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially the recent authorization
for Taiwan to purchase 150 F-16s, and the imposition of sanctions
because of Chinese trading practices are more than annoying--these
actions touch on Beijing's fundamental security interests. In fact, a
number of Chinese strategists and security analysts identify the
United States as the primary enemy in the post-cold war era.43 In any
case, the United States is a major force in East Asian regional
affairs and a major factor in China's economic development. Whether
they like it or not--and clearly many of them do not--China's leaders
must deal with the United States.
Potential Benefits of Security Cooperation.
The greater the variety of contacts in a bilateral relationship,
especially when they include activities which are very important to
both nations, the greater the points of access, and thus the greater
the number of opportunities for each participant to gain information
about the other and influence the behavior of the other. Therefore,
engaging in security cooperation, including military-to-military
relations, should be beneficial to both nations. First of all, it can
complement economic, political, and cultural exchanges already in
place, and thus give the bilateral association the appearance of a
normal and comprehensive relationship. Security cooperation will not
overcome disputes in the areas of human rights and trade, but it
should contribute to greater balance and flexibility in U.S.-China
relations.
Contacts between the U.S. and Chinese armed forces as part of the
total network of bilateral connections are especially important for
the United States because of the domestic political and economic roles
of the PLA. It is highly unlikely that the PLA will dominate Chinese
politics in the foreseeable future--"The Party controls the gun" is a
regular theme of propaganda toward the military, and civilian control
in the form of the CCP over the military has rarely been in question
in the PRC.44 But CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and
many other important figures in the history of the PRC were also
leaders of the PLA. Moreover, some members of the PLA always serve on
the major organs of the Party, although this formal influence of the
PLA within the Party has varied over the years. More significantly,
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the all-important personal links connecting the highest Party
leadership and the PLA leadership have remained vital: PLA opinion
is, and always has been, heard with sympathy at the highest levels of
decisionmaking in China.
The PLA is also an extremely important actor in the Chinese
economy. Encouraged to expand their existing relatively modest
business activity in the early 1990s to supplement relatively meager
appropriations, many PLA units, from the General Logistics Department
to battalions in the field, developed a great variety of commercial
interests, ranging from munitions to consumer products to traditional
small-scale agricultural enterprises. They produce goods for export
and for the domestic market. Reliable data are not available, but it
is estimated that the PLA earned 30 billion yuan in 1992, or as much
as the official defense budget.45 In spite of criticism from outside
and inside the military, the value of the PLA's commercial concerns
has continued to grow, at least as fast as the economy as a whole.46
Moreover, especially in times of crisis for the regime, as during
the later stages of the cultural revolution and the demonstrations at
Tiananmen Square, the PLA as an institution historically has played
critical roles in preserving the system. The Communist Party of China
is now at another critical period, with the survival of the regime
possibly at risk. U.S.-China military-to-military relations may give
the United States a better ability to anticipate the actions the PLA
may take, and therefore also anticipate likely developments within the
PRC. Possibly--but certainly not necessarily--in the mid and long
terms it may be able to influence PLA decisions, and possibly even the
political decisions of senior members of the PLA in their roles as
leaders of the CCP.
Risks of Extensive Security Cooperation.
There are probably no political or military risks to the United
States in modest security cooperation and military-to-military
cooperation with China. But some types of security cooperation, or
identification with the PLA which appears to be uncritical, do imply
some dangers.47
Popular dissatisfaction with the current regime also applies to
the PLA. It has not escaped the pervasive corruption in China. Indeed,
some observers believe that parts of the PLA are among the most
corrupt elements of the system.48 Beyond that, many in the population
still hold the PLA responsible for the massacre at Tiananmen Square.
Therefore, too close an identification with the PLA carries the risk
of appearing to favor unpopular groups least likely to support the
kind of government the United States would want to see created. This
identification could also undermine the credibility of U.S. positions
on human rights and democracy with other governments. In the event
that there were a fundamental shift in government in Beijing, an
unlikely development in the near term, too close an identification
with the most repressive institution of the present regime would
complicate U.S. access to new ruling groups, which probably would not
include PLA leaders now influential in Beijing.
A danger also exists that security cooperation with China could
have adverse affects on U.S. relations with other nations in the East
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Asia--especially China's most proximate neighbors. They favor normal
relations between the United States and China, which they hope will
help to deter China from destabilizing behavior.49 But they would all
object strongly if the United States provided assistance which
strengthened the PLA's power projection capability.
There are also risks to the PRC in an extensive security
cooperation relationship. Military-to-military relations would provide
a new channel (in addition to trade, sports, educational exchanges,
manipulation of international media, etc.) through which the United
States might, from the Chinese perspective, attempt to subvert Chinese
socialism through a campaign of peaceful evolution, a threat to PRC
values which was heralded in the Chinese press in 1990 and still
receives some attention.50 The extent to which the PRC leadership is
willing to allow large numbers of PLA officers, especially younger
ones, to interact with U.S. counterparts will be a good indication of
either the former's confidence in their own position or faith in the
loyalty and political training of the latter. Fairly active security
cooperation can take place, as it did during U.S.-China security
cooperation in the 1980s, without involving large numbers of people at
any given time, however, so that this risk to the PRC leadership need
not necessarily inhibit a renewed relationship. But any U.S. activity
which was perceived as an effort to propagate the values of "bourgeois
liberalism" would be strenuously resisted. Moreover, some PRC and PLA
officials, acculturated to value secrecy in military affairs for its
own sake, see risks in any exchange of information with a foreign
government, particularly one with the capability to frustrate PLA
plans and actions.
Parameters of U.S.-China Security Relations.
Security cooperation and military-to-military relations with
China will not fit the typical pattern of U.S. security cooperation.
Unlike most partners with the United States, China is not an ally or
even a "friendly" state, as it might have been designated in the 1980s
because of the strategic alliance against the Soviet Union. It is
worth repeating that, in addition to some common international and
global objectives which do justify collaboration, the policies of the
United States and China diverge on a number of significant issues.
They include the status of Taiwan, human rights, and a whole series of
trade questions. Moreover, China is a party to disputes, although not
actual conflict, with several nations which definitely are either
allies or friends of the United States. And while Chinese communism
has evolved so as to accept many features of a market economy,
ideological differences between the present regime in Beijing and any
possible government in Washington are fundamental. Nonetheless, even
with such a complex relationship, China has been willing to resolve
problems with the United States through dialogue and compromise.
Conflict and the threat of conflict have not been a part of U.S.-China
relations since 1971.
The nature of the relationship with China means that the
principal themes of U.S. military-to-military programs with other
major regional states are inapplicable. The United States does not
necessarily want to strengthen the military capability of China, which
could threaten allies and friends in the region and disturb existing
military balances. Interoperability should not be of primary concern
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because, except in certain types of operations other than war (e.g.,
humanitarian relief, anti-piracy operations, or perhaps U.N.-sponsored
peacekeeping), military units of the United States and China are
unlikely to serve together. Fighting side-by-side in medium to high
intensity conflict is particularly difficult to imagine now or in the
foreseeable future. Security assistance programs may have some role in
future U.S.-China security cooperation, but China is unlikely to
become either a major customer of U.S. armaments or military
technology.
In addition to the political/strategic environment, cultural
differences between the United States and China inhibit free exchanges
of information and the development of understanding. This was true
during the 1980s, when the anti-Soviet strategic alignment propelled
personnel on each side to extend good will to those on the other.
Today, without that strategic rationale and the existence of
disagreements on a range of issues, cultural and ideological
differences and stereotypes derived from them could become more
obstinate barriers.
Professional military values and interests should compensate for
some of the differences between the two societies, but the divergence
between Chinese and American military ethos is also significant,
especially in the case of ground forces. PLA ground forces are much
less oriented toward technological approaches to warfare and more
prone to accept political as well as military roles for the armed
forces than other branches. They also appear to be more enmeshed in
commercial activities, rarely considered acceptable within the U.S.
military, than do the PLAAF and PLAN. In addition to these cultural
factors, as in 1988-89, the PLA may not want to endorse a rapid pace
to security cooperation with the United States because of a shortage
of resources. Its overall budget may be larger than during the 1980s,
but it does not necessarily have more funds for security cooperation.
Moreover, the most limiting resources may be trained, reliable English
speaking personnel rather than money. (Budget and personnel restraints
may restrict U.S. contributions to military-to-military relations with
China in the future much more than was the case in the 1980s.)
While more extensive security cooperation and
military-to-military relations with China can advance U.S. interests,
they should be designed by American personnel familiar with China and
the PLA, with cultural differences in mind. Even in the 1980s, the PLA
appeared to prefer a slower, less structured approach than the
American services, especially the Army. The PLA also was more hesitant
than U.S. services to share information about its capabilities and
organization. At least in the foreseeable future, the United States
should agree to a relatively slow, cautious program which conforms to
Chinese as well as American expectations. This warning may be
especially necessary for U.S. military administrators of the program.
Their culture places a premium, usually very appropriate and
beneficial, on "can do": accomplishing the mission--in this case
expanding security cooperation with the PLA--whatever the obstacles.51
But in this instance, the obstacles should not necessarily be defeated
or overrun.
SUGGESTIONS FOR A SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM WITH CHINA
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A security cooperation program with the PRC should include the
basic components of the program of the 1980s--high level visits,
functional exchange, and technological cooperation. However, given
current and expected strategic relationships between the two nations,
the content and priority attached to the program will differ from that
of the earlier decade. Initial dialogues can seek out arenas in which
common objectives provide the basis for more extended higher level
discussions and military-to-military contacts.
The execution of U.S.-China security cooperation necessarily
involves many segments of the defense community, all of which must
have authority to carry out their missions. Nevertheless, in order to
insure that all activities conform to U.S. policy, the overall
coordination and direction should be centralized in the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD/P), in close consultation
with the Department of State. Ideally, China specialists will be
available to direct all aspects of the program, or at least advise
those who do.
In the discussions associated with high level visits, the United
States should focus on areas in which U.S.-China cooperation may
advance global and regional stability, as opposed to the former
priority of strengthening their strategic alignment to deter the
Soviet Union. Such issues would include arms and weapons technology
transfers (including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction),
drug trafficking, peaceful settlement of disputes, stability on the
Korean peninsula, and confidence-building measures to reduce the
secrecy surrounding PLA budgets and plans. Beijing and Washington will
not agree or find compromises on all of these items, or other issues
(e.g., Taiwan and the forward presence of U.S. forces in the region)
which the former may not want to introduce during high level
discussions. But even when agreement is not possible, exchanges of
positions enhance understanding. And frequent dialogues can, at least
in principle, lead to changes of policy. Hopefully, both governments
will not publicly exaggerate disagreements. Confrontation for its own
sake between China and the United States will not improve regional
stability.
Functional exchanges offer the most promising prospects for
establishing enduring military-to-military relationships. They can
provide a means for the development of personal and institutional
networks which can foster understanding and evolve into informal
structures for cooperation and collaboration. Functional exchanges
also can create opportunities for each side to gain new information
about the other, and points of access for each side to influence the
other. However, at least in the immediate future, functional exchanges
are not likely to involve many people on either side in reoccurring
contacts. Thus, personal and institutional networks are likely to
evolve slowly, only providing significant benefits of mutual
understanding and informal collaboration in the mid and long term.
Longer assignments and/or reassignments of service personnel involved
in these programs might facilitate the development of such networks.
During the first period of U.S.-China security cooperation, individual
services administered functional exchanges and they presumably will
also be the primary agents for functional exchanges in the future.
However, at least one activity, the proposed binational commission on
defense conversion, will be directly sponsored by the Office of the
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Secretary of Defense.52 There may be opportunities for other
binational commissions, perhaps examining demobilization, in the
future.
Individual services will also share responsibility for functional
exchanges with the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), which has been one
of the first participants in the resumption of U.S.-China security
relations. USPACOM not only has military-to-military programs in which
the PLA can (and does) participate, but it may be in the best position
to advise the USD/P from a joint perspective on the plans and
activities of the individual services.
To stimulate mutual understanding, the major objective of
U.S.-China functional exchanges in the post-cold war era, U.S.
services should emphasize conferences on military history, strategy,
and doctrine. They should also respond to requests from the PLA,
which, especially in the case of the PLAAF and the PLAN, may be
heavily oriented towards technology and more beneficial to Chinese
than U.S. participants. U.S. negotiators and coordinators should
insist that each exchange be at least potentially beneficial to the
military organizations in each nation, however, or be balanced by
another exchange that is. Each side in the relationship will always be
entitled to a quid pro quo.
A prudent approach will not press for exchanges in areas where
the Chinese do not seem to desire them. Where reciprocity may be a
special problem for the PLA, U.S. administrators could suggest special
arrangements by which the PLA could avoid direct reciprocity without
embarrassment if they believed the program would be particularly
valuable for the United States.
While there were a number of exchanges of delegations considering
education and training, there were no educational exchanges in the
earlier period of security cooperation. Both the Army and the Air
Force suggested educational exchanges, without positive responses
from the PLA leadership. It is possible that the latter considered
that the military education systems of the two countries were so
different that reciprocal exchanges would be unworkable. PLA leaders
may not have wanted to allow American students in Chinese military
schools, especially at staff college and war college levels, for fear
of breaches of security. Or perhaps the Chinese were unwilling to
expose their officers to bourgeois liberalism in U.S. military
schools. Most Western observers believe that this last reason was the
most salient. In any case, given the Chinese lack of enthusiasm in the
past, initiatives for educational exchange probably should come from
the PLA.
There probably cannot be a successful program of security
cooperation with China unless the PLA is allowed to purchase armaments
and military equipment from U.S. weapons producers. Beijing would view
denial as an affront, tantamount to naming China an outlaw state.
However, for reasons of both domestic and international politics, an
arms transfer program for China must be limited. As in the program of
the Reagan and Bush administrations, when the political atmosphere was
much more favorable than now, Washington should offer only clearly
defensive systems which would not directly contribute to a force
projection capability. Moveover, the United States should not
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authorize the PLA to buy weapons which it might use against Chinese
citizens: under no circumstances may a future Tiananmen Square
massacre involve American weapons or equipment. Within those
constraints, even though opposition may be expected in Congress and
segments of the public, China should be allowed to purchase from U.S.
weapons manufacturers, and, if it wants it, enjoy Foreign Military
Sales status.
Beijing, which only purchased a few U.S. weapons systems in the
1980s, is unlikely to become a major customer of U.S. defense industry
in the future for at least four reasons. First, the suspension of all
arms related programs after June 4, 1989, was unpleasant and extremely
disruptive for the Chinese. From their perspective, American companies
cannot be considered reliable when, in spite of binding legal
contracts, the flow of supplies and technology can be interrupted by
what they consider unjustified political decisions by the U.S.
Government. Second, while the resources available to the PLA are
greater than formerly, their funds for weapons and equipment
acquisition, especially from foreign sources, are limited. They are
unlikely to spend much money on imported weapons from all sources, and
they will necessarily look for bargains. Third, the best prices for
high technology items which cannot be produced in China are likely to
be offered by the Russians, who also impose less red-tape than the
United States. And fourth, Russian equipment is more compatible with
existing Chinese weapons systems, most of which are based on Soviet
designs, than U.S. equipment. Any requests from the PLA, except
perhaps for spare parts for U.S. equipment already in its inventory,
are unlikely to come soon, and they are likely to be very selective.
On the other hand, Chinese enterprises (not necessarily, but
possibly, owned by the PLA) may seek a variety of dual-use items, such
as advanced computers and information technology, alleging that they
will be used within civilian sectors of their economy although they
could also have military applications. Neither the Bush nor Clinton
administration has been unduly restrictive in dealing with such
requests, often very profitable to U.S. vendors. As in the past, they
may be treated more as commercial, as opposed to security,
transactions.
In addition to these programs there will be other dimensions to
U.S.-China security cooperation, probably including intelligence
sharing and cooperative intelligence activities. USPACOM 's
military-to-military programs can include PLA participants--PLA
representatives have already attended a Pacific Armies Management
Seminar sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific--if Beijing is interested. Air
War College and NDU programs which send groups of students abroad as a
part of their educational experience, as well as CAPSTONE participants
on worldwide orientation tours, should continue to include China on
their itineraries as long as they are welcome.53
SOME CONCLUSIONS
Assuming Washington designs and executes its participation
sensibly, renewed U.S. security cooperation with China, including
routine military-to-military contacts, supports stability in East
Asia, the overarching U.S. regional security objective, and increases
the opportunities to solicit Beijing's support in achieving some
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global objectives as well. To assure that U.S. objectives guide all
activities, policy formulation should be centralized in the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. However, the program, which
should be framed primarily to increase mutual understanding rather
than achieve operational cooperation, is unlikely to produce immediate
or dramatic results.
The renewal of U.S.security cooperation with China, potentially
the most influential nation in the region, strengthens stability in
East Asia by supplementing other dimensions of Sino-American
relations, thereby increasing U.S. involvement with China and--perhaps
more significantly--enhancing the perception that the United States is
fully engaged with the PRC. East Asian leaders view Sino-American
consultations and dialogue, particularly when they explicitly involve
security affairs, as one of the factors which could restrain China's
behavior, were the need to arise. These leaders make decisions for
their own nations partly on the basis of this perception. If security
cooperation results in more transparency in China's defense system, an
objective which the United States should pursue, the result would be
even greater predictability and stability in East Asia.
In reality (as distinguished from the realm of perceptions),
renewed security cooperation has not significantly enhanced U.S.
influence in Beijing thus far, and probably will not do so in the near
future. But it probably can expand the opportunities for American
officials to explain U.S. positions on nonproliferation, global
environmental concerns, illegal narcotics traffic, terrorism, and
other global issues, including some which may not have direct security
implications. The United States will also have more frequent
opportunities to persuade China to expand its recognition of human
rights. In addition, PLA officers participating in
military-to-military activities should be able to observe, and
hopefully appreciate, U.S. counterparts functioning in accordance with
Western human rights standards.
U.S.-China military-to-military relations should be kept at a
level sufficient to keep an inter-military dialogue going but modest
enough not to strain the capacity of either side. In offering weapons
and military technology to the PLA, Washington must always consider
regional military balances and the attitudes of other East Asian
governments. Moreover, it must avoid selling the PLA weapons which
might be used against its own population.
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Bates Gill, The Challenge of Chinese Arms Proliferation: U.S. Policy
for the 1990s, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, August 31, 1993, pp. 1-12.
35. While it is true that East Asian politics were not
subordinated to cold war considerations as much as in Europe, the
bipolar structure nonetheless had a restraining impact on most powers.
For a insightful presentation of this view, see Richard K. Betts,
"Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States
after the Cold War," International Security, Volume 18, Number 3,
Winter 1993/94, pp. 34-77.
36. For example, see David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's
Challenge to Asian Security," Security, Volume 36, Number 2, Summer
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March 31, 1993, p. A21.
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Status," Orbis, Volume 38, Number 2, Spring 1994, pp. 157-176.
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38. The remaining territorial dispute with Russia concerns the
boundary along the Amur River. Japan and China both claim sovereignty
to barren islets north of Taiwan named Senkakku in Japanese and
Diaoyutai in Chinese. Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam are
in dispute with China, and to some degree with each other, over the
Spratly Islands. Vietnam and China also dispute sovereignty over the
Paracel Islands.
39. This discussion is primarily based on George Segal, "China
Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy," Adelphi Paper 287,
March 1994.
40. Segal, p. 15. Lincoln Kaye, "Haves and Have-Nots," Far
Eastern Economic Review, September 2, 1993, p. 46, speculates that the
ratio of urban to rural income, which was 1.7:1 in 1985 after 7 years
of Deng's agricultural reforms, was probably 4:1 in 1993. Official
statistics place the ratio at 2.3:1.
41. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
42. During the author's discussions with observers of Chinese
politics in Hong Kong in March 1994, there was virtually unanimous
agreement that the Communist Party of China is facing a serious crisis
of legitimacy, and that the current leadership is unusually insecure.
43. Shambaugh, p. 49.
44. It is an article of faith of the CCP that the PLA is a
servant of the Party. Since the Tiananmen massacres this has been the
dominant theme of major military publications.
45. See Tai Ming Cheung, "Serve the People," Far Eastern Economic
Review, October 14, 1993, pp 64-66; and Segal, p. 26.
46. "Hostile Takeover: China Reigns in PLA Businesses," Far
Eastern Economic Review, February 17, 1994, p. 5. The number of
concerns operated by the PLA, and the size of the revenue they
generate, are matters of conjecture, even to the leaders of the PLA.
Cheung, "Serve the People."
47. An American observer in Hong Kong, who does not want to be
identified, warned against relations between the PLA and the American
military which appeared to be "intimate."
48. Consensus of a group of Hong Kong specialists on China and
the PLA in February 1994. Many of the generalizations concerning the
PLA were derived from discussions in Hong Kong with a number of
observers, often in animated conversations and discussions in which it
was difficult to determine who was responsible for a given comment.
49. A strategy of ASEAN, which Beijing is resisting, appears to
be to enmesh China in a network of regional and bilateral
relationships. See Nayan Chanda, "Divide and Rule," Far Eastern
Economic Review, August 11, 1994, p. 18.
50. Harry Harding, "`On the Four Great Relationships:'
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Prospects for China," Survival, Volume 36, Number 2, Summer 1994, pp.
22-42, states that the mainstream press has not emphasized "peaceful
evolution" since 1992. However, Shambaugh, p. 50, suggests that the
concept still resonates among security specialists.
51. Several observers of U.S.-China security cooperation from
within the American military, who spoke under nonattribution rules,
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